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Abstract 
Statistical agencies typically impute inflation for disappearing products based on surviving products, 
which may result in overstated inflation and understated growth. Using U.S. Census data, we apply 
two ways of assessing the magnitude of “missing growth” for private nonfarm businesses from 1983–
2013. The first approach exploits information on the market share of surviving plants. The second 
approach applies indirect inference to firm-level data. We find: (i) missing growth from imputation is 
substantial — at least 0.6 percentage points per year; and (ii) most of the missing growth is due to 
creative destruction (as opposed to new varieties). 
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21 Introduction
Whereas it is straightforward to compute inflation for an unchanging set of
goods and services, it is much harder to separate inflation from quality
improvements and variety expansion amidst a changing set of items. In the
U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI), over 3% of items exit the market each month
(Bils and Klenow, 2004). In the Producer Price Index (PPI) the figure is over 2%
per month (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).
The Boskin Commission (Boskin et al., 1996) highlighted the challenges of
measuring quality improvements when incumbents upgrade their products. It
also maintained that the CPI does not fully capture the benefits of brand new
varieties. We argue that there exists a subtler, overlooked bias in the case of
creative destruction. When the producer of the outgoing item does not produce
the incoming item, the standard procedure at statistical offices is to resort to
some form of imputation. Imputation inserts the average price growth among
a set of surviving products that were not creatively destroyed.1 We think this
misses some growth because inflation is likely to be below-average for items
subject to creative destruction.2
Creative destruction is believed to be a key source of economic growth. See
Aghion and Howitt (1992), Akcigit and Kerr (2010), and Aghion, Akcigit and
Howitt (2014). We therefore attempt to quantify the extent of “missing
growth”—the difference between actual and measured productivity
growth—due to the use of imputation in cases of creative destruction. Our
estimates are for the U.S. nonfarm business sector over the past three decades.
1U.S. General Accounting Office (1999) details CPI procedures for dealing with product
exit. For the PPI, “If no price from a participating company has been received in a particular
month, the change in the price of the associated item will, in general, be estimated by averaging
the price changes for the other items within the same cell for which price reports have
been received.” (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015, p.10) The BLS makes explicit quality
adjustments, such as using hedonics, predominantly for goods that undergo periodic model
changes by incumbent producers (Groshen et al., 2017).
2A similar bias could arise due to creative destruction at times of regular rotation of items in
the CPI and PPI samples.
3In the first part of the paper we develop a growth model with (exogenous)
innovation to provide explicit expressions for missing growth. In this model,
innovation may either create new varieties or replace existing varieties with
products of higher quality. The quality improvements can be performed by
incumbents on their own products, or by competing incumbents and entrants
(creative destruction). The model predicts missing growth due to creative
destruction if the statistical office resorts to imputation.
In the second part of the paper we use two alternative approaches to
estimate the magnitude of missing growth based on our model. For both
approaches we use micro data from the U.S. Census on employment at all
private nonfarm businesses. for the years 1983–2013. For the first approach we
look at employment shares of continuing (incumbent), entering, and exiting
plants. If new plants produce new varieties and carry out creative destruction,
then the inroads they make in incumbents’ market share should signal their
contribution to growth.
In the second approach, we extend the algorithm from Garcia-Macia, Hsieh
and Klenow (2016) to estimate the arrival rates and step sizes of the various
kinds of innovations (creative destruction by entrants and incumbents,
incumbent own innovation, expanding variety by entrants and incumbents).
We then use our accounting framework to calculate missing growth. This
second approach allows us to estimate the contribution of each of the different
types of innovation to missing growth. It does not assume that only new plants
introduce new varieties and carry out creative destruction, but does rely on
indirect inference.
Our findings from these two quantifications can be summarized as follows.
First, missing growth from imputation is substantial. We estimate that missing
growth averages around one-third of true total productivity growth using the
two methods. Second, the primary source of missing growth appears to be
creative destruction rather than new varieties.
Example: The following numerical example is meant to provide a simple
4illustration of how imputation can miss growth. Suppose that: (i) 80% of
products in the economy experience no innovation in a given period and are
subject to a 4% inflation rate; (ii) 10% of products experience quality
improvement without creative destruction, with their quality-adjusted prices
falling 6% (i.e., an inflation rate of -6%); and (iii) 10% of products experience
quality improvement due to creative destruction, with their quality-adjusted
prices also falling by 6%. The true inflation rate in this economy is then 2%.
Suppose further that nominal output grows at 4%, so that true productivity
growth is 2% after subtracting the 2% true inflation rate.
What happens if the statistical office resorts to imputation in cases of
creative destruction? Then it will not correctly decompose the growth in
nominal output into its inflation and real growth components. Imputation
means that the statistical office will ignore the goods subject to creative
destruction when computing the inflation rate for the whole economy, and
only consider the products that were not subject to innovation plus the
products for which innovation did not involve creative destruction. Thus the
statistical office will take the average inflation rate for the whole economy to be
equal to
8
9
· 4% + 1
9
· (−6%) = 2.9%.
Presuming it correctly evaluates the growth in nominal GDP to be 4%, the
statistical office will (incorrectly) infer that the growth rate of real output is
4%− 2.9% = 1.1%.
This in turn implies ”missing growth” in productivity amounting to
2%− 1.1% = 0.9%
This is end of the example, which hopefully clarifies the main mechanism by
which imputation can miss growth from creative destruction.
5Our study relates to several strands of literature. The first is the pioneering
work of Abramovitz (1956), Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), Griliches (1996)
and Diewert (2000) on the measurement of Total Factor Productivity (TFP).3
Second, our paper builds on the innovation-based endogenous growth
literature (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt,
1992). Third is the literature on growth, reallocation and firm dynamics (Klette
and Kortum, 2004; Akcigit and Kerr, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2013; Haltiwanger,
2015).4
Our paper touches on the recent literature about secular stagnation and
growth measurement. Gordon (2012) observes that a rising flow of patented
innovations has not been mirrored by an acceleration in measured TFP
growth. 5 He argues that innovation has run into diminishing returns, leading
to an irreversible slowing of TFP growth. Syverson (2016) and Byrne, Fernald
and Reinsdorf (2016) conclude that understated growth in certain sectors,
most notably the ICT sector, cannot account for the productivity slowdown
since 2005 because the ICT sector is small relative to the aggregate economy. In
contrast to these studies, we look at missing growth for the whole economy,
not just from the ICT sector. We find that missing growth has not risen in the
past decade.
More closely related to our analysis are Feenstra (1994), Bils and Klenow
(2001), Bils (2009), Broda and Weinstein (2010), Erickson and Pakes (2011),
Byrne, Oliner and Sichel (2015), and Redding and Weinstein (2016).6 We make
two contributions relative to these important papers. First, we compute
3See also Hulten (2000) and Lipsey and Carlaw (2000, 2004).
4See also Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1998) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000).
5Related studies include Jones (1995), Kortum (1997), and Bloom et al. (2017).
6Feenstra (1994) corrects for biases in the U.S. import price indices of six manufacturing
goods, in particular due to an expanding set of available product varieties. Bils and Klenow
(2001) use the U.S. Consumer Expenditure surveys to estimate “quality Engel curves” and
assess the unmeasured quality growth of 66 durable goods which account for 12% of consumer
spending. Bils (2009) uses CPI micro data to decompose the observed price increases of durable
goods into quality changes and true inflation. Broda and Weinstein (2010) look at missing
growth from entry and exit of products in the nondurable retail sector, using an AC Nielsen
database. Byrne, Oliner and Sichel (2015) look at missing growth in the semiconductor sector.
6missing growth for the entire private nonfarm sector from 1983–2013.7 Second,
we focus on a neglected source of missing growth, namely imputation in the
event of product exit. We isolate missing growth from creative destruction as
opposed to the more familiar quality improvements by incumbents on their
own products and expanding variety. The missing growth we identify is likely
to be exacerbated when there is error in measuring quality improvements by
incumbents on their own products.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out a
growth model and derive the expression for missing growth and how it relates
to creative destruction. In Section 3 we use the two alternative approaches,
based on continuing plants’ market shares and indirect inference, respectively,
to estimate missing growth using U.S. Census data. Section 4 concludes.
2 A model of missing growth
In this section we develop a simple accounting framework that allows us to
analyze the determinants of missing growth in the aggregate economy from
imputation in the event of creative destruction.
2.1 Basic setup
2.1.1 Structure of the aggregate economy
Time is discrete and in each period output has a CES structure:
Y =
(∫ N
0
[q(j) y(j)]
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
. (1)
7Broda and Weinstein (2010) used AC Nielsen data from 1994 and 1999–2003. This database
is heavily weighted toward nondurables, particularly food. Bils and Klenow (2004) report a
product exit rate of about 2.4% per month for nondurables (1.2% a month for food) versus about
6.2% per month for durable goods. Hence, it is important to analyze missing growth across
many sectors of the economy, including durables.
8Unlike Broda and Weinstein (2010), we do not assume that the BLS makes no effort
to quantify such quality improvements. Bils (2009) estimates that the BLS subtracted
0.7 percentage points per year from inflation for durables over 1988–2006 due to quality
improvements. For the whole CPI, Moulton and Moses (1997) calculate that the BLS subtracted
1.8 percentage points in 1995.
7We assume that Y is competitively produced from intermediate inputs y(j) that
come at quality q(j)9. N is the number of intermediate varieties available, which
can grow over time. An alternative interpretation of Y is that it denotes utility
of a representative consumer. With either interpretation, σ ≥ 1 denotes the
constant elasticity of substitution between the different intermediate goods.10
2.1.2 Intermediate input production
Each intermediate input y(j) is produced one-for-one with labor, i.e., we have
y(j) = l(j),
where l(j) is the amount of labor used to produce intermediate good j.11
2.1.3 Resource constraint and market structure
The final good sector is assumed to be competitive. Hence, each intermediate
good is paid its marginal product in producing the final good. Intermediate
producers are monopolistic but potentially subject to a competitive fringe. A
representative household supplies a fixed amount of labor every period. Labor
is freely mobile across firms and the wage rate, W , is common across firms in
equilibrium. Nominal expenditure by the representative household on the final
good is given by M , which yields the budget constraint
M = PY.
9We remove time subscripts when is does not risk confusion.
10The production function in (1) is not well defined for σ = 1. In this special case, we assume
technology takes a Cobb-Douglas form
Y = N exp
(
1
N
∫ N
0
log [q(j) y(j)] dj
)
.
We will use σ > 1 for our quantitative exercises based on estimates in the literature. But the
special case with σ = 1 is helpful for highlighting channels of missing growth (see Section ??).
11Below we present evidence for innovation from quality improvements rather than process
innovations.
8P denotes the (quality-adjusted) price index that we will specify further below.
We will next analyze how, for a given path of M or W , innovations of
different sorts affect the true (quality-adjusted) price index, P . This will allow
us to decompose changes in nominal output, M , into inflation and growth in
real output, Y . We will then model the statistical office’s imputation procedure
to measure price inflation in the economy and show how this imputation leads
to a bias in estimated real output growth — i.e., to missing growth. Finally, we
will highlight how this simple accounting framework can be used to quantify
missing growth from data on market shares of surviving incumbent vs. newly
entering producers.
2.1.4 Equilibrium prices
Suppose the existence of a competitive fringe which limits the markup, the
producer of intermediate input j can charge at µ˜ > 1 over marginal cost
c(j) = W . Profit maximization by the intermediate monopolist of each input j
then implies that it is optimal to charge a markup factor of µ > 1, where
µ = min
{
µ˜, σ
σ−1
}
.12 Hence, we obtain in equilibrium for the price of each
intermediate good j
p(j) = µW, ∀j. (2)
2.1.5 Innovation
We model technical change as product innovation.13 At each point in time, and
for each intermediate input j there is a common exogenous probability of
creative destruction λd ∈ [0, 1)]. I.e., with probability λd the incumbent firm of
12In the absence of a binding competitive fringe on the intermediate producer’s market, one
can show that that it is optimal to set µ = σσ−1 .
13This modeling choice matters in our empirical context since pure process innovation is
arguably more likely to be captured by the statistical office. Yet, across firms and plants with
price information in the Census of Manufacturing, we find that firm/plant revenues increase
without a decline in unit prices. This suggests that innovations are rather of the product than
of the process type. Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2016) provide similar evidence for retail
prices of consumer nondurable manufacturers.
9input j is replaced by a new producer. We assume that the new producer (who
may be an entrant or an incumbent firm) improves upon the previous
producer’s quality by a factor γd > 1. The previous producer cannot profitably
produce due to limit pricing by the new producer.14 If j is an existing variety
where quality is improved upon by a new producer, we have
qt+1(j) = γd qt(j).
We refer to this innovation process as creative destruction.
In addition, for products j where the incumbent producer is not eclipsed by
creative destruction, there is each period an exogenous arrival rate λi ∈ [0, 1) of
an innovation that improves their by factor γi > 1. Hence, if j is a variety where
quality is improved upon by the incumbent producer, we have
qt+1(j) = γiqt(j).
We call this incumbent own innovation. The main difference from creative
destruction is that the producer of j changes with creative destruction,
whereas it stays the same with incumbent own innovation.
The arrival rates and step sizes of creative destruction and incumbent own
innovation are constant over time and across varieties.
Finally, each period t + 1, a flow of λnNt new product varieties ι ∈ (Nt, Nt+1]
are created and available to final goods producers from t + 1 onward.
Consequently, the law of motion for the number of intermediate inputs is
Nt+1 = (1 + λn)Nt.
The (relative) quality of new product varieties satisfies the following
assumption:
14We assume Bertrand competition within each product market, which allows the new
producer, who produces a better product at the same cost as the current producer, to drive
the current producer out of the market.
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Assumption 1 A firm that introduces in period t + 1 a new variety ι starts with
a quality that equals γn > 0 times the “average” quality of pre-existing varieties
j ∈ [0, Nt] in period t, or formally
qt+1(ι) = γn
(
1
Nt
∫ Nt
0
qt(j)
σ−1dj
) 1
σ−1
, ∀ι ∈ (Nt, Nt+1].
The average quality in Assumption 1 refers to the geometric average that
depends on the elasticity of substitution. We do not put further restrictions on
the value of γn so that new products may enter the market with above-average
(γn > 1), average (γn = 1) or below-average quality (γn < 1).
To summarize, there are three sources of growth in this framework: First, the
quality of some products increases due to creative destruction. Second, for some
other products quality increases as a result of incumbent own innovation. Third,
new product varieties are invented which affects aggregate output, because the
production function (1) features love-for-variety.
2.2 Missing growth
2.2.1 Missing growth as mismeasured inflation
Because aggregate nominal output M is equal to the product of the price index,
P , and real output, Y , gross real output growth between t and t + 1 can be
expressed as
Yt+1
Yt
=
Mt+1
Mt
· Pt
Pt+1
,
where Pt
Pt+1
is the inverse of the gross inflation rate. We assume that nominal
output growth, Mt+1
Mt
, is perfectly measured, in which case the mismeasurement
in real output growth is entirely due to mismeasured inflation.
More formally, if P̂t
Pt+1
denotes measured inverse inflation, then measured real
output growth is equal to
Ŷt+1
Yt
=
Mt+1
Mt
· P̂t
Pt+1
.
11
Expressed in log first differences the rate of “missing” output growth is equal to
MGt+1 = log
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
− log
(
Ŷt+1
Yt
)
= log
(
P̂t+1
Pt
)
− log
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
. (3)
Thus there will be missing growth if inflation is overstated.
2.2.2 True prices and inflation
The aggregate price index In the following we derive the exact welfare-based
aggregate price index. The results follow from the final goods sector maximizing
current final output, Y , with respect to {y(j)}Nj=0 subject to M =
∫ N
0
y(j)p(j)dj.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium: (i) the demand for an intermediate product y(j)
of quality q(j) sold at price p(j) is given by
y(j) = q(j)σ−1
[
P
p(j)
]σ
M
P
, ∀j. (4)
(ii) the equilibrium aggregate price index is given by
P =
(∫ N
0
[
p(j)
q(j)
]1−σ
dj
) 1
1−σ
. (5)
Under optimal price setting of the firms we obtain
P = µW
(∫ N
0
q(j)σ−1dj
) 1
1−σ
. (6)
For the proof see Online Appendix B.
The true inflation rate Using (6), we can compute the true inflation rate as a
function of the arrival rates and the step sizes of the various types of
innovations. We obtain the following proposition:
12
Proposition 2 The true gross inflation rate in the economy is given by
Pt+1
Pt
=
Wt+1
Wt
[
1 + λd
(
γσ−1d − 1
)
+ (1− λd)λi
(
γσ−1i − 1
)
+ λnγ
σ−1
n
] 1
1−σ . (7)
For the proof see Online Appendix B.
Proposition 2 shows how the arrival rates and step sizes of the different type
of innovation affect the inflation rate (for a given change in wages). The term
λnγ
σ−1
n captures the effect of variety expansion on inflation, and the inflation
rate is indeed falling in λn and γn. The term (1 − λd)λi
(
γσ−1i − 1
)
summarizes
the effect of incumbent own innovation on price growth. The inflation rate is
monotonically decreasing in λi and γi. The term λd
(
γσ−1d − 1
)
captures the
effect from creative destruction on the inflation rate. The inflation rate is
monotonically decreasing in γd. The only comparative static effect that is not
immediately clear is the one with respect to λd. This ambiguity is due to the
interaction between the arrival rates of creative destruction and incumbent
own innovation. It is easy to show that, whenever creative destruction has a net
positive effect on growth, the inflation rate is indeed decreasing in λd since
then we must have
γσ−1d − 1 > λi(γσ−1i − 1). (8)
This is a condition we will get back to further below.
2.2.3 Imputation and measured inflation
Throughout we assume the statistical office perfectly observes nominal output
and wage growth. Hence, as highlighted in (3), missing growth arises if
quality-adjusted price changes are overstated. We further assume that the
statistical office has no problem measuring unit prices. Thus the difficulty in
arriving at quality-adjusted price changes is in measuring quality changes (and
in incorporating the benefits of new varieties).
There are well-known challenges to assessing quality changes when firms
upgrade their own products, say from one model year to another Boskin et al.
13
(1996). Quality improvements implemented by new producers (i.e., through
creative destruction), pose an additional measurement challenge. When the
item produced by a given seller has disappeared altogether, the standard
procedure used by statistical offices is imputation.15 Imputation uses the rate
of inflation for a set of continuing products that were not subject to creative
destruction. This procedure is valid if the rate of inflation associated with
creative destruction is the same as that for products with a surviving
incumbent producer. But the vast majority of these surviving products are not
being improved in a given period, according to the BLS.16 Instances of creative
destruction are linked to innovative success, thus creative destruction is
typically associated with more rapid quality improvements than surviving
products taken as a whole.
We formally characterize imputation as follows:17
Assumption 2 In the presence of product entry and exit the statistical office
resorts to imputation, i.e., the set of products with a surviving incumbent
producer is assumed to be representative and the economy-wide inflation rate is
imputed from this subset of products.
Products of continuing producers can be either subject to incumbent own
innovation or no innovation at all. We denote the statistical office’s estimates
for the frequency and step size of quality-improving innovations on surviving
products as λ̂i and γ̂i.
15Using statistics from Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Online Appendix A calculates that
imputation was used 90% of the time in the years 1988–2004 when a producer ceased selling
a product in the CPI.
16See Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). In Online Appendix A we
argue — based on CPI micro data — that at a monthly frequency λi is less than 1%.
17Erickson and Pakes (2011) likewise identify imputation as a source of upward bias in
estimating the average price change for exiting products. In their application to consumer
electronics, they argue that even the BLS’s hedonic procedures — which estimate the missing
price of exiting goods using regressions of prices on observable product characteristics — fail to
eliminate the bias because they do not correct for time-varying unmeasured characteristics of
the goods.
14
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 2, the measured inflation rate is given by(
P̂t+1
Pt
)
=
Wt+1
Wt
[
1 + λ̂i
(
γ̂i
σ−1 − 1)] 11−σ . (9)
For a proof see Online Appendix B.
Henceforth we assume that the statistical office perfectly observes the
frequency and step size of incumbent own innovations, i.e., we have λ̂i = λi
and γ̂i = γi. We make this assumption to isolate missing growth due to
imputation.18
2.2.4 Formula for missing growth
Recall that missing real output growth between period t and t + 1 is caused by
upward bias in estimating inflation as in (3). Missing growth can be expressed
in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Missing real output growth is given by
MG =
1
σ − 1 log
[
1 +
λd
[
γσ−1d − 1− λi
(
γσ−1i − 1
)]
+ λnγ
σ−1
n
1 + λi
(
γσ−1i − 1
) ] . (10)
Proof. Equation (10) is obtained from combining (3), (7), and (9).
Because the statistical office imputes the inflation rate from products with
surviving producers (Assumption 2), there are two sources of missing growth:
(i) variety expansion; and (ii) creative destruction, which is imputed but not
directly measured. The last term in the numerator in the square brackets in
equation (4) captures new variety creation. As long as there is net entry, i.e.,
λn > 0, there is positive missing growth from this source. The first term in the
numerator captures missing growth from not properly factoring in creative
destruction.
18In equation (31) below, we show how missing growth would change if the quality
improvement of incumbents is not perfectly measured.
15
The statistical office understates true output growth if the imputed growth
from creative destruction (which is imputed from products with surviving
producer) understates the true expected growth from creative destruction.
This can happen in two ways: (i) creative destruction has a larger step size than
incumbent own innovation (γd > γi) and/or (ii) not all of the surviving
incumbents innovate (λi < 1). Note that missing growth from creative
destruction remains positive even in the special case where creative
destruction and incumbent innovation have the same step size, if not all of the
surviving products are subject to incumbent own innovation (i.e., λi < 1).
Missing growth is increasing in γd, and also in λd as long as(
γσ−1d − 1
)
> λi
(
γσ−1i − 1
)
. This is the same condition which ensures that
overall true growth is increasing in λd (see (8)). Missing growth is large if
creative destruction is an important source of true growth19.
3 Estimating missing growth
In this section we explore two alternative approaches for quantifying missing
growth in the U.S. data. Both approaches build on the model developed in the
previous section. The first approach uses information on the market shares of
entrants, exiters and survivors. We refer to it as the market share approach. The
second approach uses the algorithm in Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2016)
to infer arrival rates and step sizes of different type of innovations and compute
missing growth. We refer to this as the indirect inference method.
3.1 The market share approach
Here we show how to use our model in the previous Section 2 to estimate
missing growth using data on the market share of entering establishments
(plants), surviving plants, and exiting plants. This approach does not allow us
to differentiate between the different sources of missing growth (creative
19See Online Appendix C for an illustration with the Cobb-Douglas production function.
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destruction vs. variety expansion), but it provides a simple and intuitive
quantification.
3.1.1 Relating missing growth to market share dynamics
The idea behind the market share approach is that the nominal expenditure
shares of different products contain information about their quality-adjusted
prices. The imputation used by statistical offices assumes that the
quality-adjusted price growth of products from surviving producers is
representative for the economy-wide inflation rate. The CES framework of
Section 2 suggests a simple test for the representativeness of this set of
products: it is representative if and only if the market share of this set remains
stable over time. Moreover, given an estimate for the elasticity of substitution
between products, we will show how market shares can be used to quantify
missing growth.
To construct the main argument, define the market share of a product j as:
s(j) ≡ p(j)y(j)
M
, where M = PY denotes aggregate nominal output. Combining
this definition with the demand curve in (4) gives
s(j) =
(
P
p(j)/q(j)
)σ−1
.
Hence, the market share of product j is given by a power function of the quality-
adjusted price of j relative to the aggregate price index, P . With a CES structure,
a similar relationship also holds for the market share of a subset of products. We
are particularly interested in the subset of products the statistical office bases its
imputation on — those products with a surviving producer between the periods
t and t + 1 — which we denote It = [0, Nt] \ Dt, where Dt represents the set
of products which underwent creative destruction between t and t + 1. In the
following we refer to the set of products It as the continuers between t and t+1.
17
In period t the aggregate market share of these continuers is given by
SIt,t =
∫
It
(
Pt
pt(j)/qt(j)
)σ−1
dj.
A period later, the aggregate market share of the same continuers is
SIt,t+1 =
∫
It
(
Pt+1
pt+1(j′)/qt+1(j′)
)σ−1
dj′.
These two expressions together imply that the growth rate of the continuers’
market share is given by
SIt,t+1
SIt,t
=
(
Pt+1/Pt
PIt,t+1/PIt,t
)σ−1
.
This highlights that, if the inflation rate of the continuers is representative of the
aggregate inflation rate, then the market share of the continuers should remain
stable over time. If, instead, the market share of continuers is systematically
shrinking over time, we conclude that the inflation rate of the continuers must
have been higher than the one of the aggregate economy (because σ > 1).
Using the price setting of firms (2) and the specified innovation processes,
we can then express the growth rate of the market share of continuers as follows:
Proposition 5 The gross growth rate of the market share of continuers from t to
t+ 1 is given by
SIt,t+1
SIt,t
=
(
Pt+1
Pt
)σ−1(
Wt+1
Wt
)1−σ
(1− λi + λiγσ−1i ).
For a proof see Online Appendix B.
As shown in Proposition 5, the price index of continuers grows at the rate of
the nominal wage Wt
Wt+1
times
(
1− λi + λiγσ−1i
)1/(1−σ)
, which captures the
impact of incumbent own innovation on prices. Under the assumption that the
statistical office perfectly observes quality improvements due to incumbent
own innovation — γ̂i = γi and λ̂i = λi — the market share growth of continuers
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can then be related to the measured inflation rate (see Proposition 3):
SIt,t+1
SIt,t
=
(
Pt+1
Pt
)σ−1(
P̂t+1
Pt
)−(σ−1)
. (11)
As argued before, the market share growth of continuers is a power function of
the gross growth factor of the price index of these continuers relative to the
aggregate price index. These continuers are precisely the set of products the
imputation is based upon. Under the assumption that the statistical office
perfectly measures the quality-adjusted price inflation of continuers, this gives
us a simple test for the representativeness of these products. As shown in (11),
the quality-adjusted price dynamics of the continuers is representative if and
only if their market share is stable over time. If instead the market share of
continuers decreases over time, then measured inflation P̂t+1
Pt
is too high and
there is missing growth (given σ > 1). For a given value of the elasticity of
substitution, σ, (11) can be exploited to quantify missing growth. This is
underscored in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 If incumbent own innovation is captured perfectly, then missing
growth from imputation can be calculated from the market share dynamics of
continuers as
MGt+1 = log
(
P̂t+1
Pt
)
− log
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
=
1
σ − 1 log
(
SIt,t
SIt,t+1
)
. (12)
Proof. Combining (3) and (11) directly proves the proposition.
Since σ > 1, missing growth is positive whenever the market share of
continuers shrinks over time.20 In the following we use equation (12) to
quantify missing growth. Our next step is to explain how we try to measure
20Our market share approach is clearly related to Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein
(2010). They also make use of the basic idea that, in a CES world, quality-adjusted prices are
isoelastically related to nominal expenditure shares. But they assume that all quality growth is
missed. We allow for the fact that statistical offices do attempt to measure quality changes, in
particular for continuers. Our focus is therefore on the subtler question of whether imputation
in the case of creative destruction leads to missing growth.
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continuer market shares in the data.
3.1.2 Measuring the continuers’ market share
Our goal is to quantify missing growth in the aggregate economy over a time
horizon of several decades. We therefore base our market share approach
estimates of missing growth on the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD),
which covers all nonfarm business sector plants with at least one employee.
We use the employment/payroll information in this dataset to infer SIt,t.
Ideally we would have data at the product level for each firm.
Unfortunately, such data does not exist for the aggregate U.S. economy outside
of manufacturing (Census of Manufacturing) or consumer nondurable
manufacturing (AC Nielsen scanner data). In lieu of such ideal data, we
suppose that firms must add plants in order to produce new products. Such
new plants could be at entering firms or at existing firms. And the products
produced by new plants could be brand new varieties or the result of creative
destruction. Moreover, we assume that all incumbent own innovation occurs
at existing plants. Under these assumptions, we can use continuing plants as a
proxy for continuers.
These assumptions are admittedly strong (we will relax them in our second
approach, though indirect inference has limitations of its own). Our
assumptions require that firms do not add products through existing plants.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) find that U.S. manufacturing plants do
start up production in new industries. But perhaps our assumption is a better
one outside manufacturing, such as in retail where location is a key form of
product differentiation.
If existing plants do introduce new varieties or carry out creative
destruction, then our market share approach is likely to understate missing
growth. As we will explain below, our baseline specification will only assess
market shares of new plants after a 5 year lag. Hence, the critical assumption is
that plants do not add new products after the age of 5 years. We can offer two
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facts that provide some reassurance here. First, employment growth rates are
much lower after 5 years than before 5 years of age (Haltiwanger, Jarmin and
Miranda, 2013). Second, plant exit rates do fall with age, but not very sharply
after age 5 (Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow, 2016). If plants added varieties as
they aged, then one would expect exit rates to fall for surviving plants.
Note also that our approach uses employment (or payroll) data to measure
market shares, rather than revenue data. In our model these variables are all
proportional to each other across products. But in practice they could differ.
Plant revenue data are only available at the firm level, and to us only every 5
years in the manufacturing sector. As a robustness check below we report on
revenue results for manufacturing.
To be more exact, we implement the market share approach on plant data
as follow. Let B denote the first year of operation and D denote the last year of
operation of a plant. Then the continuing plants It are those plants who were
born in t or before and who die in year t + 1 or later. That is, B ≤ t and
D > t+ 1. Define Et as the group of plants entering in t (B = t,D ≥ t) and Xt as
the group of plants exiting between t and t + 1 (B ≤ t,D = t). Let L(t,M)
denote the total employment or payroll in period t of plants belonging to group
M. We then measure the ratio SIt,t
SIt,t+1
on the right-hand side of (12) as
SIt,t
SIt,t+1
=
L(t, It)
L(t, It) + L(t,Xt)
L(t+ 1, It)
L(t+ 1, It) + L(t+ 1, Et+1)
, (13)
According to (13), missing growth is positive whenever the
employment/payroll share of continuing plants shrinks between t and t + 1.
For our baseline results we will rely on employment data. In Section 3.1.4 we
present results with payroll data as a robustness check.
Precisely how do we measure the first period of operation, B, and the last
period of operation, D, in the data? We define a period t as a calendar year. We
map D to the last year a plant is in LBD. We could map B to the first year the
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plant appears in the LBD. But it may take time for plants to accumulate
customers and market share — even conditional on the price, quality, and
variety of their products. And, as argued above, plants may be most likely to
add products in their first 5 years, judging from their growth rates.
With these considerations in mind, we set B equal to k ≥ 0 years after the
plant first appears in the LBD. If Bd denotes the first year the plant appears in
the database, we map B into Bd + k. We use k = 5 in our baseline specification.
As mentioned, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) find that “the fastest-
growing continuing firms are young firms under the age of 5” (see their figure
4B), and the same is true at the plant level. We check robustness to alternative
lags in Section 3.1.4.
To reiterate, we use the market share after a lag to obtain a measure of
market share that is arguably more tightly related to the quality-adjusted price
of new plants. A new plant may take a number of years to adjust its inputs and
accumulate customers. By abstracting from plants that enter and exit within
the 5 year window, our approach may also be more robust to short run
churning in the labor market that might be subject to cyclical taste shifts.
Finally, to quantify missing growth we need to parametrize the elasticity of
substitution. As our baseline value we choose σ = 4 based on Redding and
Weinstein (2016) and Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2016). We check
robustness to higher and lower elasticities in Section 3.1.4.21
3.1.3 The market share of missing growth: results
Our baseline results calculate missing growth from 1983–2013 using LBD data.
The LBD contains data on employment and payroll going back to 1976, but the
payroll data features a number of implausible outliers before 1989. We therefore
use employment data for our baseline estimates. Using the employment data,
21Our baseline is the median value of the elasticity of substitution within a product category
across different producers from Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2016). Our robustness checks
cover the interquartile range of the elasticity of substitution estimates in Hottman, Redding and
Weinstein (2016).
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we identify entrants beginning in 1977. For our benchmark with 5 years lag,
1983 is the earliest year we can calculate missing growth (market share growth
of survivors between 1982 and 1983) because we use plants that have been in
the data for at least 5 years.
Table 1 presents our missing growth estimates with σ = 4 and k = 5, and
compares them to official TFP growth. The entries are annual percentage
points. We find on average 0.64 percentage points of missing growth per year
from 1983–2013. BLS measured TFP growth over the same interval was 1.87
percentage points per year.22 If we add our missing growth to the BLS TFP
series we arrive at “true” growth of 2.51% per year. Thus our baseline estimate
is that about one-fourth of true growth is missed.
Table 1: MEASURED VS. TRUE GROWTH WITH THE MARKET SHARE
APPROACH
Missing Measured “True” % of growth
Growth Growth Growth missed
1983–2013 0.64 1.87 2.51 25%
1983–1995 0.66 1.80 2.46 27%
1996–2005 0.55 2.68 3.23 17%
2006–2013 0.74 0.98 1.72 43%
Notes: This table presents measured growth, true growth, missing growth and the
corresponding share of total growth that is missed by the statistical office for the whole
period 1983–2013 as well as for different sub-periods. Measured, true and missing growth
are expressed in (average) percentage points per year. Missing growth is calculated
using the market share approach in Proposition 6. The market share is measured as
the employment share of plants taken from the Census’ Longitudinal Business Database
(LBD) as described in (13). These baseline results assume a lag k = 5 and an elasticity
of substitution σ = 4. Measured growth is calculated as the BLS MFP series + R&D
contribution expressed in labor-augmenting terms. True growth is the sum of measured
growth and missing growth.
Table 1 also breaks the 30 year sample into three sub-periods: 1983–1995 (an
22We put BLS TFP growth in labor-augmenting form, include the BLS estimates of the
contribution of R&D and intellectual property to TFP growth. The BLS multifactor productivity
series uses real output growth from the BEA. The vast majority of the price indices that go into
constructing BEA real output growth come from the BLS (see U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(2014)), even if the BEA weights sectors differently than in the aggregate CPI or PPI.
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initial period of average official growth), 1996–2005 (a middle period of rapid
official growth), and 2006–2013 (a final period of low official TFP growth). Did
missing growth contribute to the speedup or slowdown? Our estimates say yes,
but modestly at most. Missing growth slowed down 11 basis points when official
growth accelerated by 88 basis points in the middle period. And missing growth
sped up by 19 basis points when official growth dropped 170 basis points in the
final period.
3.1.4 The market share of missing growth: robustness and discussion
In this section we discuss the robustness of our market share approach to
quantifying missing growth. We show how our main results are affected by
alternative assumptions about the lag used to defined new plants, the elasticity
of substitution, and the data used to measure market shares (using payroll
instead of employment data).
Using payroll to measure market shares Table 2 compares missing growth
based on employment vs. payroll. The payroll data allows us to do this only
from 1989 onward. The estimates are quite similar overall, but exhibit a bigger
dip and bounce back across the three sub-periods.
Table 2: DIFFERENT MEASURES OF MARKET SHARE
Employment Payroll
1989–2013 0.70 0.72
1989–1995 0.86 0.97
1996–2005 0.55 0.43
2006–2013 0.74 0.83
Notes: See footnotes in Table 1.
Recall that, in manufacturing only, we also have access to revenue data. We
find that the market share of continuing manufacturing shrinks more when
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based on revenue than employment or payroll, so that missing growth as
defined by (12) is higher when market share is measured in terms of revenue.
Different lag k Our baseline results in Table 1 evaluate the market share of
entrants after a lag of k = 5 years. Table 3 indicates how the results change if we
instead look at market shares with no lag after entry. With k = 0 missing growth
is much smaller, averaging 20 basis points per year rather than 64 basis points.
Though not reported in Table 3, for k = 3 we obtain estimates of missing growth
closer to k = 5. Increasing the lag beyond the baseline to k = 7 years increases
missing growth only slightly compared to k = 5.
Table 3: DIFFERENT LAG LENGTHS k
k = 5 k = 0
1983–2013 0.64 0.20
1983–1995 0.66 0.28
1996–2005 0.55 0.20
2006–2013 0.74 0.07
Notes: See footnotes in Table 1.
Elasticities of substitution As shown in equation (12) above, missing growth
under the market share approach is proportional to 1/(σ − 1), where σ is the
elasticity of substitution across varieties. Thus our missing growth estimates
decline monotonically as we vary σ from 3 to 4 (our baseline) to 5 in Table 4. The
lower is σ, the bigger must be the quality and variety improvements brought by
new plants to explain a given decline in the observed market share of continuing
plants.
In Online Appendix D we extend our framework to allow the elasticity of
substitution to vary across sectors. Our market share approach applies easily
to this more complicated nested structure. And below we show results under a
two-tier specification with a lower elasticity of substitution within industries
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(σ > 1) than across industries.
Table 4: DIFFERENT ELASTICITIES σ
Missing Growth
σ = 3 σ = 4 σ = 5
1983–2013 0.96 0.64 0.48
1983–1995 0.98 0.66 0.49
1996–2005 0.82 0.55 0.41
2006–2013 1.11 0.74 0.56
Notes: See footnotes in Table 1.
Sectoral missing growth The market share approach is well-suited to analyze
missing growth at a more disaggregated level. To illustrate this point, we
calculate missing growth using equation (12) and data on employment shares
of incumbent, entering, and exiting plants within 2-digit NAICS sectors (2002
classification).
Table 5 shows missing growth in the five sectors with the highest shares of
overall employment (with a combined share of 60% of all employment).
Interestingly, we find very little missing growth in manufacturing or education.
For health care, retail trade, and restaurants & hotels, in contrast, missing
growth averages 80 basis points per year or more. The retail trade contribution
may reflect the geographic spread of outlets by big box chains. Health care
might capture how new facilities have more up-to-date equipment and
treatment than dated facilities. Perhaps reassuringly, our aggregate missing
growth is not driven by one particular sector.
The variation in missing growth across sectors in Table 5 suggests that
official relative price trends across sectors may be biased considerably. Taken
at face value, our estimates would alter the pattern of Baumol’s cost disease
and affect how one would estimate the elasticity of substitution across sectors.
We also calculated missing growth at a more detailed level and then
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Table 5: MISSING GROWTH BY SECTORS, AVERAGE 1983-2013
Sector Missing growth Employment share
Manufacturing 0.04 16%
Health Care 0.80 13%
Retail Trade 0.91 12%
Education 0.06 11%
Restaurants & Hotels 1.64 7%
Notes: This table presents average missing growth estimates and employment share for the whole
1983–2013 period at the plant level for top employment 2 digit NAICS 2002 sectors. See footnotes in
Table 1 for construction of missing growth.
aggregated the sectoral missing growth rates using Tornqvist employment
shares of each sector as weights. This assumes a nested CES structure where
products within a sector have an elasticity of substitution of 4 and sectors are
aggregated in translog fashion. Table 6 compares our benchmark missing
growth estimates to those obtained by aggregating up missing growth in this
way from the 2 to 5 digit sectoral level. The estimates are gently increasing in
the level of disaggregation used (from 64 basis points to 72), and our broadly
similar across sub-periods.23
Table 6: MISSING GROWTH WITH DISAGGREGATED SECTORS
1-sector 2-digit 3-digit 4-digit 5-digits
1983–2013 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.73 0.72
1983–1995 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.68 0.67
1996–2005 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.64 0.63
2006–2013 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.91 0.92
Notes: This table presents employment share weighted average of missing growth estimated at
different NAICS 2002 digit levels. See footnotes in Table 1 for construction of missing growth.
23We also aggregated sectoral missing growth rates using average employment shares
over the entire 1983–2013 period to fully eliminate any trends due to changes in sectoral
composition. The results were very similar to those in Table 6.
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Declining dynamism and missing growth One may wonder why our missing
growth estimates do not trend downward along with rates of entry, exit and job
reallocation across firms — the “declining dynamism” documented by Decker
et al. (2014)). The answer is three-fold. First, we look at plants (establishments)
not firms. Second, our market share equation for missing growth is tied to the
net entry rate (weighted by employment), not the gross job creation rate due
to entrants. Put differently, the growth of survivors’ market share is influenced
by the difference between the job creation rate due to new plants and the job
destruction rate due to exiting plants. Unlike gross flows at the firm level, we
see no trend in the net job creation rate of plants over 1983–2013 in the LBD.
Finally, we look at market shares five years after the plant appears in the LBD,
rather than immediately upon entry.
Table 7 illustrates these points of distinction between our market share
approach and declining dynamism. Across the first two columns, missing
growth drops dramatically when moving from plants to firms. Many new
plants are at existing firms, and they are bigger on average than new plants in
new firms. Also, unlike our plant-level estimates, missing growth declines over
time when based on firm-level data.
Table 7: MISSING GROWTH VS. DECLINING DYNAMISM
Plant level Firm level Net entry Gross entry
1983–2013 0.64 0.22 0.37 0.19
1983–1995 0.66 0.33 0.54 0.70
1996–2005 0.55 0.17 0.40 0.06
2006–2013 0.74 0.09 0.06 -0.49
Notes: The entries are missing growth in percentage points per year. See footnotes in Table 1 for construction
of missing growth.
To demonstrate the importance of entrant/exiter vs. continuers growth, the
third column of Table 7 shows how big missing growth would be using firm
level data and assuming all firms were the same size. In this case, missing
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growth is larger than the firm-level estimate because entering firms tend to be
smaller than the average firm. But missing growth continues to plummet over
the sample.
Finally, the gross entry rate has declined more than the net entry rate, and
our missing growth estimates focus on the net entry rate. To illustrate this point,
the last column of Table 7 shows missing growth if all firms were equal-sized and
the exit rate was fixed. Missing growth declines even more precipitously when
measured in this counterfactual way. In the data, the exit rate fell along with the
entry rate, dampening the decline in missing growth.
We base our missing growth estimates on plant dynamic, rather than firm
dynamics, because we think it is much defensible to assume plants do not add
new products than to assume that firms do not do so.
In the Online Appendix we discuss further extensions of our analysis in this
section: capital in production, varying markups, gains from variety, bias in
measuring incumbent own innovation, importing and outsourcing.
3.2 The indirect inference method
In this section we provide an alternative, indirect inference approach to
quantify missing growth. It allows us to, in principle, separate the two sources
of missing growth — creative destruction and variety expansion. The method
relies on first estimating the arrival rates and step sizes and then plugging
these values into formula (10) in Proposition 4 to arrive at missing growth. To
estimate the arrival rates and step sizes, we adapt the algorithm developed in
Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2016), henceforth GHK.
The original GHK algorithm GHK’s algorithm uses indirect inference to
estimate the step size and arrival rate of three types of innovation: Own
innovation (OI), Creative Destruction (CD), and New Varieties (NV). GHK
estimate these parameters to fit aggregate TFP growth; the mean, minimum
(one worker), and standard deviation of employment across firms; the share of
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employment in young firms (firms less than 5 years old); the overall job
creation and destruction rates; the share of job creation from firms that grew
by less 1 log point (three-fold) over a five year period; employment share by
age; exit rate by size; and the growth rate in the number of firms (which is equal
to the growth rate of employment in the model).24 They calculate these
moments in the LBD for 1983–1993, 1993–2003 and 2003–2013, respectively.25
With their parameter estimates in hand, GHK decompose growth into
contributions from new varieties, incumbent innovation on their own
products, creative destruction by incumbents, and creative destruction by
entering firms.
How we differ from GHK Our model in Section 2 differs from the GHK model
in several respects. GHK keep track of firms with multiple products, and
estimate rates of creative destruction and new variety creation separately for
entrants and incumbents. GHK also endogenize product exit: firms drop
products whose quality relative to the average quality is below a certain cutoff.
And rather than assuming a fixed step size for innovations, in GHK quality
innovations are drawn from a Pareto distribution, where the same Pareto shape
parameter (and hence the same average step size) is assumed for quality
innovations from incumbents’ own innovation and from innovations involving
creative destruction. Finally, in GHK new varieties are drawn from a scaled
version of the existing quality distribution rather than massing at a single point
relative to the existing distribution.
As a result of these differences, GHK obtain an expression for true
productivity growth which is somewhat different from that in our Section 2.
24GHK assume each variety carries an overhead cost. Firms choose to retire a variety if the
expected profits from that variety do not cover the overhead cost. GHK calibrate the overhead
cost to match minimum employment in the data.
25Their algorithm matches model steady state moments to data moments, and therefore
does not produce annual estimates.
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Using our notation, true productivity growth g ≡ Yt+1
Yt
− 1 in GHK is
1 + g =
[
(1− δoψ)
{
[λi(1− λe,d − λi,d) + (λe,d + λi,d)] (γσ−1i − 1) + 1
}
+ (λi,n + λe,n)γ
σ−1
n
] 1
σ−1 (14)
where δo denotes the share of products in the previous period whose quality
falls below the obsolescence cutoff; ψ is the average quality of those
below-cutoff products relative to the average quality;26 λi is the share of
products that are not obsolete, did not experience creative destruction, and did
experience an innovation by the incumbent producer; λe,d is the share of
non-obsolete products with entrant creative destruction; λi,d is the share of
non-obsolete products with incumbent creative destruction; λi,n + λe,n is the
mass of new varieties from incumbents and entrants relative to the mass of
products in the previous period; and γi and γd are the average step sizes of own
innovation and creative destruction, respectively. As in GHK, we assume that
the two step sizes are the same, which is why only γi appears in equation (14).
Finally, γn is the average quality of a new variety relative to the average quality
of varieties produced in the previous period. The term 1 − δ0ψ adjusts for the
endogenous loss of varieties due to obsolescence.
The equation for measured growth ĝ in our modified GHK model is the same
as in our Section 2 above:
1 + ĝ =
(
1 + λi(γ
σ−1
i − 1)
) 1
σ−1 . (15)
Recall that we assume the BLS accurately measures the arrival rate and the
average step size of incumbents’ own innovations. To adapt the GHK
methodology to our model with missing growth, we make the following
26δo =
∫
q(j)<q¯t,q(j)∈Ωt
1 dj and ψδo =
∫
q<q¯t,q∈Ωt
qσ−1t (j)dj∫
q∈Ωt
qσ−1t (j)dj
where Ωt denotes the set of products in
t.
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changes to the original GHK algorithm:27
1. We choose parameters so that (15) matches the observed growth rates:
1.66% for 1983–1993, 2.29% for 1993–2003 and 1.32% for 2003–2013,
according to the BLS.
2. We restrict the sum of the (unconditional) arrival rates of OI and CD to
equal the cumulative rate of non-comparable substitutions from the CPI
over 5 years.
Key advantages of this indirect inference method include: (i) we need not
assume that creative destruction and new product varieties only come from
new plants (the inference is on firm-level data and allows for multi-product
firms); incumbent plants may also produce CD or NV innovations; (ii) we can
decompose missing growth into its CD and NV components using the arrival
rates and step sizes of the various kinds of innovations; and (iii) we allow for
the possibility of products disappearing because of obsolescence.
Results from indirect inference Table 8 defines the parameters and displays
their estimated values for each the three samples: “1988” for 1983–1993, “1998”
for 1993–2003, and “2008” for 2003–2013. The bottom panel of Table 8 reports
the resulting estimates of measured, true, and missing growth. Missing growth
is larger under this alternative approach than in the previous section using the
market share approach for the sample periods 1988 and 1998: 1.25 percentage
points per year (vs. 0.64 when using the market share approach) for the “1988”
period, and 1.13 percentage points per year (vs. 0.55) for the “1998” period. For
the last sample period, “2008”, the missing growth estimates from the indirect
inference method are closer to those from the market share approach at (0.60
percent vs. 0.76). The fraction of total productivity growth that is missed is
comparable across the three periods at around one-third of true growth.
27See our Online Appendix H for a more details description of the changes we made.
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Table 8: ESTIMATED PARAMETERS AND RESULTS WITH INDIRECT INFERENCE
Parameter Definition 1988 1998 2008
λd CD arrival rate 0.014 0.011 0.010
λi OI arrival rate (if survive) 0.024 0.027 0.027
λn NV arrival rate 0.004 0.002 0.002
γd, γi Step size of CD, OI 1.106 1.125 1. 074
γn Step size of NV 0.328 0.482 0.366
Measured growth per year (ppt) 1.66 2.29 1.32
Missing growth (ppt) 1.25 1.13 0.60
True growth per year (ppt) 2.91 3.42 1.92
% of missing growth from CD 79.4% 79.7% 80.8%
% of growth missed 43.0% 32.9% 31.2%
Notes: Results from running the algorithm from Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2016) on three samples:
1983–1993, 1993–2003 and 2003–2013. The algorithm has been extended to fit our hypothesis as explained in the
text.
As mentioned, an advantage of the indirect inference approach over the
market share approach is that here we can decompose missing growth into its
new varieties (NV) and creative destruction (CD) components. We calculate
missing growth from creative destruction by taking the difference between
measured productivity growth and the productivity growth that results when
we set the total arrival rate for new varieties (λi,n + λe,n) equal to zero. We find
that vast majority of the missing growth is due to creative destruction —
around 80% in all three periods.
3.3 Comparison of the two quantification methods
As stressed, the market share approach uses plant-level data (assuming no
added products per plant, and focusing attention on plants that are at least five
years old), whereas the indirect inference approach uses firm-level data. The
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market share approach assumes that creative destruction only occurs through
new plants. The indirect inference method allows for creative destruction by
existing plants as well. This may be why we found larger average missing
growth in this second quantification than in the market share approach.
The falling entry rate of new firms over the past three decades (“declining
dynamism”) may explain why missing growth declines across the three periods
in the indirect inference approach, which again uses firm-level data. The
market share approach with plant-level exhibited no such decline. But when,
as a robustness check, we applied the market share approach to firm-level
data, we did obtain a sharp decline in missing growth across periods (Table 7).
As already mentioned above, indirect inference did not require that only
entrant plants create new varieties or generate creative destruction; and this
method allowed us to split overall missing growth into its NV and CD
components. On the other hand, the market share approach is simple, requires
fewer model assumptions, and was not too data demanding.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a Schumpeterian growth model with incumbent
and entrant innovation to assess the unmeasured TFP growth resulting from
creative destruction. Crucial to this missing growth was the use of imputation
by statistical agencies when producers no longer sell a product line. Our model
generated an explicit expression for missing TFP growth as a function of the
frequency and size of creative destruction vs. other types of innovation.
Based on the model and U.S. Census data for all nonfarm businesses from
1983–2013, we explored two ways of estimating the magnitude of missing
growth from creative destruction. The first approach used the employment
shares of surviving, entering, and exiting plants. The second approach adapted
the indirect inference algorithm of Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2016) to
firm-level data. The former, “market share” approach is simple, intuitive and
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easy to replicate for different economies, but assumes all creative destruction
occurs through new plants and cannot separate out missing growth from
expanding variety. The latter “indirect inference” approach is more involved
and less intuitive, but does not require creative destruction to occur through
new plants. The second approach, moreover, allows us to decompose missing
growth into that from creative destruction vs. expanding variety.
We found that: (i) missing growth from imputation was substantial —
around one-fourth to one-third of total productivity growth; and (ii) it was
mostly due to creative destruction.
We may be understating missing growth because we assumed there were no
errors in measuring quality improvements by incumbents on their own
products. We think missing growth from imputation is over and above (and
amplified by) the quality bias emphasized by the Boskin Commission.28
Our analysis could be extended in several interesting directions. One would
be to look at missing growth in countries other than the U.S. A second
extension would be to revisit optimal innovation policy. Based on Atkeson and
Burstein (2015), the optimal subsidy to R&D may be bigger if true growth is
higher than measured growth. Conversely, our estimates give a more
prominent role to creative destruction with its attendant business stealing.
A natural question is how statistical offices should alter their methodology
in light of our results, presuming our estimates are sound. The market share
approach would be hard to implement without a major expansion of BLS data
collection to include market shares for entering, surviving, and exiting
products in all sectors. The indirect inference approach is even less conducive
to high frequency analysis. A feasible compromise might be for the BLS to
impute inflation for disappearing products based on inflation only for those
surviving products that have been innovated upon.29
28Leading economists at the BLS and BEA recently estimated that quality bias from health
and ICT alone was about 40 basis points per year from 2000–2015 Groshen et al. (2017).
29Erickson and Pakes (2011) suggest that, for those categories in which data are available to
do hedonics, the BLS could improve upon the imputation method by using hedonic estimation
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Our missing growth estimates have other implications which deserve to be
explored further. First, ideas may be getting harder to find, but not as quickly
as official statistics suggest if missing growth is sizable and relatively stable.
This would have ramifications for the production of ideas and future growth
(Gordon, 2012; Bloom et al., 2017). Second, the U.S. Federal Reserve might
wish to raise its inflation target to come closer to achieving quality-adjusted
price stability. Third, a higher fraction of children may enjoy a better quality of
life than their parents (Chetty et al., 2017). Fourth, as stressed by the Boskin
Commission, U.S. tax brackets and Social Security benefits may rise too steeply
since they are indexed to measured inflation, the inverse of measured growth.
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